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Although art events rarely attract the attention of high politics, this is what happened 
in the winter of 1977. Dissenso Culturale was a grand event organized in the framework 
of the Venice Biennale, one of the most prestigious expositions of the international art 
world, and brought the unofficial contemporary cultures of Soviet bloc countries into 
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sharp focus. Writers, filmmakers, visual artists, theorists and scholars were invited to the 
Biennale from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. In addition to 
art exhibits, film screenings, and lectures on music, literature, and theater, debates were 
also held on issues of historical, political, literary, musical, religious and scholarly life in 
the East European region. These debates were mostly an exchange of ideas between ex-
perts on Eastern Europe or leftists intellectuals from the West and East European artists 
and dissidents, most of whom lived in exile at the time. 
The Biennale del Dissenso was uniquely important because this was the first time the 
issue of East European art appeared programmatically in the Cold War period. Just as 
significantly, in the complex and contradictory political context of interpreting East Eu-
ropean art, the nuanced formulation of the related ideas was exceptional. In the present 
study I aim to depict some problems related to this “dissident biennale”, determine its 
presumptive goals as well as present the people and intentions at work in the back-
ground. How did the Biennale del Dissenso help construct a politically charged image 
of East European culture and what impact did this construct have on the two opposing 
sides? I will also reflect over how the event brought about a lasting transformation of the 
Biennale as an institution.1 
Although the Venice Biennale has long been established as one of the most prestigious 
institutions of the international art world, its declared ideal of political neutrality has, 
in fact, never been that far from the world of politics. The ensemble of national pavil-
ions, the link between freshly produced art and the goal of national representation were 
subsumed in the overarching program of supra-nationality, which turned into a system 
rife with political challenges and tensions caused by the rivalry of national pavilions. It 
is noteworthy that the institution of modern Olympics – starting almost concurrently 
with the Biennale in 1896 – also plays off the idea of supra-nationality against national 
rivalry. These structures are magnets for highly political issues and conflicts, bringing 
them to ostensibly “politically neutral” spaces and enabling the demonstration of oppos-
ing political conceptions.2 
Under Carlo Ripa di Meana’s directorship, the seventies saw a sharp turn in the relation-
ship of the Venice Biennale to politics.3 Like many other outstanding curators of the pe-
riod, Ripa di Meana was interested in the current concerns of contemporary art, but he 
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almost exclusively focused on political themes, which was a risky strategy for a number 
of reasons. Inasmuch as the basic structure of the Biennale was a dual one, humanist-
universalist (whereby apolitical) and simultaneously national-rival (whereby political), 
Ripa di Meana’s concept could be seen as curtailing apolitical humanism in order to face 
the Biennale’s other, political side, while also trying to reinterpret the political aspects of 
the Biennale. Ripa di Meana cared little for engaging in national rivalry or displaying na-
tional specificities. Contrary to cultural political designs manifested in the competition 
of pavilions, he had a vision and a robust curatorial conception. He thought the funda-
mental political and cultural division of the European continent could not be captured 
through granting each system the opportunity to display an idealized self-representation 
in the language of an aestheticizing apolitical humanism. This is a remarkable goal set-
ting even if the Biennale del Dissenso was doomed to failure in several respects. 
Carlo Ripa di Meana was Director of the Biennale between 1974–1979, during which 
period he had three large-scale projects. In 1974, he arranged an exhibition in the frame-
work of the Biennale devoted to the criticism of the Pinochet regime of Chile, which was 
an unusually speedy reaction and was in accord with the leftist critique of the period. 
In 1977, a grand-scale exhibition, comprehensive in its objectives, and a series of events 
were to provide an overview of East European “dissident culture.” Thus, both initiatives 
dealt with sensitive issues of current world politics. Such an agenda was alien to the gen-
eral spirit of the Biennale, and there was no consensus whether or not Ripa di Meana’s 
program should be continued. Ripa di Meana’s last, explicitly apolitical endeavor is a 
clear sign of reservations about the direct and immediate treatment of political issues: 
the exhibition “From Nature to Art, from Art to Nature,” was the Director’s return to 
the Biennale’s humanist-universalist foundational idea a year before his term came to an 
end. 
The case of the Biennale del Dissenso is particularly interesting because it allows the trac-
ing of all the issues and conflicts that led to the political changes of the détente process. 
The emblematic human and civil rights issues of the seventies, the new developments of 
Eurocommunism and the relationship between the western Left and the Soviet Union 
once again intensified tensions between the two different world orders. It was incidents 
between 1968–1975 that led to the international discussion and subsequently the codi-
fication of human rights affairs in Eastern Bloc countries. After signing the Helsinki 
Accords, the hope of the so-called “third basket” 4 proved unrealistic in light of the wave 
of reprisals against civil rights movements in the Eastern Bloc. The so-called “third bas-
ket” of the Helsinki Accords was signed in 1975 and addressed issues of cooperation in 
humanitarian and other affairs, including stipulations about the enforcement of human 
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During the months of debate prior to the Biennale, both the East and the West were 
pointing to Helsinki. According to the West, basic human rights and liberties were not 
being respected in the East Bloc any more than before, whereas the leaders of socialist 
countries assessed the advocating of these ideas as a withdrawal from the consensus of 
the détente process after the cold war. At the same time, the dilemma concerning human 
rights and national sovereignty was also articulated in the West: after Helsinki, individual 
countries had no prerogative to influence other countries’ internal political affairs. As 
formulated by The Guardian: “it is a fact, tragic as it is, that the fight for human rights 
needs to be subordinated to the fight for disarmament and nuclear understanding be-
tween governments because of the horrible possibility of nuclear war.”5
In 1976, more than a third of Italian voters opted for the Italian Communist Party 
(Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI), the largest communist party in Europe which was 
a significant player in Italian domestic affairs from 1945 onwards.6 The PCI wanted to 
achieve socialism through structural reforms from the sixties on, and increased their 
distance to the political practice of East European countries. This process was sharpened 
when Palmiro Togliatti’s “political testament” was published. Palmiro Togliatti led the 
PCI from 1927 to his death in 1964. In his notes on Yalta, written before his death, 
Togliatti severely criticized socialist countries, tackled the questions of political plural-
ism, the political opposition, of ideological and cultural freedom as well as human rights. 
At the time of the 1976 elections, many expected that the communists, having engaged 
in constructive oppositional politics, would secure a position in government. All of this 
jeopardized the position of the other left-leaning party, the socialists, at the time mem-
bers of a social-democratic coalition. Despite the PCI’s impressive election results, the 
Christian Democrats’ decades-long anticommunist rhetoric came out winning: Giulio 
Andreotti, the new prime minister, eventually included no communist or socialist politi-
cians in his government coalition. 
Italian communists were nevertheless popular in the seventies. They had never been 
in government, so corruption did not cast a shadow over them, and a turn in western 
communist ideology was also favorable to them. Some of the key moments of this turn 
were the conference of European communist parties in Berlin in 1976,7 and the book 
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and subsequently banned in the Eastern Bloc. Communist parties across Europe tried to 
bolster their increasingly shaky positions – deteriorating since the late forties – through 
critically analyzing the market economy on the one hand and, on the other, condemning 
“actually existing socialism.” Bearing in mind the realities of western societies, they had 
to give up on the idea of adapting the Soviet model in their own countries. They had to 
clarify to voters and sympathizers – and not the least to themselves – that the kind of 
socialism they advocated did rest on Marxist foundations but was not a western replica 
of the eastern pattern. In addition to protecting civil liberties, they also had to prove their 
political independence from the Soviet Union. They felt compelled to find arguments for 
the compatibility of liberty and socialism despite the fact that civil liberties were never 
realized in the Eastern bloc. As western intelligentsia, too, was relinquishing illusions 
about the political Left, communist parties’ best chance to strengthen their positions 
in politics and public opinion was taking up the defense of East European dissidents. 
Although the communists were increasingly open to vilifying state socialism, it was not 
until the end of the seventies that they openly criticized the Soviet system. 
On the occasion of the Venice Biennale, the PCI maneuvered itself into a particularly 
tight corner; in the end, they could barely make up their minds whether they should sup-
port the event at all.8 As a reassuring response to the complaints of the Hungarian lead-
ership, Giorgio Napolitano, secretary of the PCI, stated that his party was not support-
ing the program of the Biennale; moreover, communists in the Biennale’s board voted 
against the event. According to Napolitano’s account, their delegates were instructed to 
refute any criticism of the party, and L’Unita, the central paper of the party, also vowed 
loyalty.9 Members of the PCI sitting on the Biennale’s board of directors vigorously criti-
cized the program devoted to the “dissidents” of the socialist countries and reminded all 
of the original topic: the relationship between power and the cultural avant-garde rather 
than the topic of the dissidents.10
Biennale director Carlo Ripa di Meana was a prominent figure in the Italian socialist 
party during the seventies and there is little doubt that Bettino Craxi, the leader of the 
socialist party also supported the cause of the Biennale. Craxi correctly predicted that the 
radical program of “lending a hand” to the East European opposition demanding civil 
liberties could with them sympathy within Italian society. Interestingly, however, the 
majority of the party members did not favor the Biennale, even if they did not go as far 
as rejecting its general spirit. This might be explained by the fact that, in the seventies, 
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shaped by post-68 polemics between the western Left and the socialist countries. Thus, 
generational differences also played a part in Italian socialists’ acceptance or rejection of 
the Biennale. 
Soviet protest and threats did not only force the Italian political elite to make excuses 
but also generated defiant national reactions, which justly shows how contradictory the 
situation was within Italian domestic affairs. The anti-Biennale group included politi-
cians as influential as Carlo Giulio Argan, mayor of Rome, who derided the event as a 
“Solzhenitsyn parade”.11 When, however, Deputy Minister of Culture Vladimir Popov 
threatened the dissident topic might result in the deterioration of economic relations 
with Northern Italian, the pro-Biennale camp suddenly expanded and L’Unita, too, be-
gan publishing laments over the possible failure of the Biennale.12 This was the moment 
when Ripa di Meana announced his resignation the second time, claiming that he found 
it impossible to meet so many different political demands. His first resignation was in 
response to the announcement of Nikita Ryjov, Soviet ambassador to Rome, who de-
manded on behalf of all Warsaw Pact countries that the Italian government retract the 
program of the Dissenso Biennale or else, the Soviets would never participate in the Ven-
ice Biennale ever again.13 The public outcry following Ripa di Meana’s announcement 
nevertheless returned him strengthened to the directorial position. 
There was no doubt that socialist countries should boycott the Biennale, refusing to 
participate even in preparatory meetings. They notified the Italians via diplomatic chan-
nels and drew up action plans for the necessary countermeasures.14 According to the 
Hungarian statement, it was “unacceptable for an event calling itself an international 
art meeting to determine participants from invited countries not on the basis of artistic 
merit, but by explicitly political criteria and geographical affiliation, thus insinuating the 
existence of an organized opposition in Hungary. The arbitrary selection of invitees, the 
planned joint appearance of artists living in Hungary and beyond its borders, and the 
deceptive statements about participation issued without prior consultation all go against 
the established practice and rules of international cultural cooperation. This procedure 
can be considered an interference with Hungary’s internal artistic affairs.”15 Among other 
things, the plan of action recommended the rejection of passport applications of those 
intending to travel and the persuasion of all invited “artists with a professional reputa-
tion” to turn down the invitation. Another proposal was to identify which cultural events 
planned to take place across Italy under the duration of the Biennale could be used for 
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ian government’s position to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.16 Italian ambassador 
Antonio Paolucci refused to take responsibility, claiming that despite the Biennale receiv-
ing substantial state funding, it was an autonomous body outside state administration, 
hence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not interfere with its program.17 This was a 
new situation: while Italy’s bilateral economic, political and cultural relations with the 
socialist countries worked quite well, developments on this particular plane showed a 
different picture. The discrepancy between the will of the state and Biennale-related 
public propaganda signaled a new situation compared to the experience of preceding 
years. Italy’s parliament also put the case of the Biennale on its agenda. The Hungarian 
Ministry’ position was, however, that Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Arnaldo Forlani 
restricted himself to mere diplomatic statements. Since Forlani did not commit to either 
party, he clearly favored the organizers of the Biennale, the Hungarians thought.18 The 
resulting tensions had to be dealt with, so one of the suggestions made by the Italian 
side was to invite “orthodox Marxists” to Venice a few days before the Biennale’s open-
ing. Invitees, however, found this an unfortunate idea, saying that they would not be 
able to leave without mention the arrest of Charta 77 leaders and of the Prague trials.19 
Numerous state companies “sabotaged” the event under Soviet pressure.20 On behalf of 
the Association of Hungarian Film and Television Artists, director Zoltán Fábri wrote 
a letter of protest in which he objected to the “arbitrary screening” of Hungarian films 
at the Biennale and possibly attributing a meaning to these films that might be at odds 
with the intentions of their authors.21 The Milan-based Ricordi music publishing house 
refused to grant permission to play a Shostakovich opus written specifically as a score for 
Grigory Kozintsev’s 1929 film “New Babylon,” the screening of which was going to be 
one of the concluding events of the Biennale. 
The socialist countries resorted to the tactics of “counter-events” for the purpose of “po-
litical neutralization.” Hungarians popularized the Kodály system in Italian cities, the 
Children’s Choir of the Hungarian Radio gave a concert series, music and film festivals 
were organized. The GDR organized a book exhibition in Milan; lectures on cultural 
life in the GDR were held in Rome, Venice, and Florence. The most significant East-
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Romantic painters on St. Mark’s Square. The choice of locations is significant: in the fall 
of 1977, it was precisely the cities listed above that hosted sympathy events in support 
of the East European opposition. In Rome, a “Sakharov hearing” was held on Novem-
ber 25-27, 1977, to which socialist deputy mayor Ottavio Colzi had personally invited 
the Nobel Laureate writer when he had visited Moscow in August. The City Council 
of Florence held a debate earlier that year on “Problems faced by dissident thinkers in 
Eastern Europe”, and in September Elio Gabbuggiani, the communist mayor of the city, 
officially received Andrei Sakharov’s wife, who was visiting Italy at the time.22 
The “brotherly” East Bloc countries carefully coordinated their efforts to prevent their 
dissidents’ participation in Venice. According to an official memorandum, country lead-
ers reckoned that the Biennale went against the spirit of the Helsinki Accords. The “arbi-
trary” selection of artists was considered an interference with internal affairs and the aim 
of presenting “dissident culture” was seen as an attempt to organize the opposition. It is 
not known if János Kádár, the Hungarian First Secretary, had any information about the 
planned event during his visit to Rome that summer, but his speech there foreshadowed, 
as it were, the official view of the event. “The issue of human rights is not a problem 
internally. But if there is an attempt to use it for interfering with our internal affairs, 
we must refute all such attempts.”23 The Soviets clearly designated the Biennale as an 
“unfriendly step” timed to coincide with the Belgrade Conference and the 60th anniver-
sary of the Great October Revolution. They claimed that the organizers, through giving 
moral support to the opposition, pushed socialist countries in a defensive position at the 
Belgrade Conference.24 The Soviets were the most cynical, perhaps, when they returned 
Andrei Sakharov’s invitation to the Biennale with the note “addressee unknown.” 
The names of those who were denied permission by their own countries to travel to the 
Biennale were read out aloud by Carlo Ripa di Meana at the Belgrade Conference. Based 
on information obtained by the Hungarian daily Népszabadság, the board of the Bien-
nale was less than delighted with this action, in which Ripa di Meana virtually acted as 
a private individual. Such gestures were not considered to benefit the cause of the Bien-
nale; on the contrary, “they exacerbate problems that are complicated by nature and con-
tribute to the domination of the Biennale by propaganda considerations.”25 However, 
communist board members did not merely object to Carlo Ripa di Meana’s appearance 
in Belgrade, but also to the fact that he had excluded from the preparatory process the 
scholarly committee whose duty was to professionally supervise the Biennale. 
Due to the nonparticipation of the socialist countries, the Eastern Bloc was mostly rep-
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Polish Leszek Kolakowski, Yosif Brodsky, Viktor Nekrasov or Edward Goldstücker, the 
ex-president of the Czech Writers’ Union, all based in Britain. Artur London, the émigré 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Czechoslovakia, attended the screening of a docu-
mentary on an 1952 trial26 in which he himself had been sentenced to life imprisonment 
at the time. 
A historical colloquium with seven sessions, entitled “Freedom and Socialism, historical 
monuments of dissidence” was held in the Napoleon Hall on St. Mark’s Square.27 Promi-
nent East European dissidents and western historians, artists and politicians debated on 
the issues of human, political, economic, social rights as well as the freedom of artistic ex-
pression. Speakers included Jean Daniel, editor of Le Nouvel Observateur, Ante Ciliga as 
one of the founders of the Yugoslav communist party, Gilles Martinet, the international 
secretary of the French socialist party, Monty Johnstone on behalf of the British com-
munist party, French sociologist Edgar Morin, as well as Giuseppe Boffa, Leszek Kola-
kowski, Alain Besançon, Piero Melograni, Leonid Pljušč, and Andrei Amalrik. Hungar-
ians were represented by members of the emigrant group in Paris; Tibor Méray lectured 
on literary taboos, while sociologist Péter Kende analyzed the prospects of East European 
democratic institutions and democratic movements using Polish, Czech and Hungarian 
examples. General debates centered on. György Konrád, who was living in West Berlin 
at the time, gave a lecture on “Dissidence in literature”.28 
Nearly all major western leftist parties sent observers, whereas a good number of Italian 
professors suddenly found very important university commitments preventing their at-
tendance. Some were not allowed to participate by their institutions, and others decided 
to stay away themselves. “Not only the East Europeans not allowed to travel were absent 
from the first major working group session “Freedom and Socialism”. The white-gold 
Empire-style meeting rooms had plenty of empty seats on the other side too.”29 As some 
reports reveal, the relationship between western and East European intellectuals was like 
that of two parallels never meant to meet in infinity. The correspondent of Die Welt 
characterizes the grotesque situation vividly: “Viktor Nekrasov (author of the widely read 
novel Stalingrad), Vladimir Maximov, Andrei Siniavsky, Alexander Galich, and poet Iosif 
Brodsky were all sitting there modestly and silently – while a talkative professor from 
Texas explained to all those present how things stood with contemporary Soviet litera-
ture. When, during one of the breaks, old warhorse Nekrasov recognized the famous Pol-
ish dramatist Slawomir Mrožek standing modestly in the shadow of a pillar, he shouted 
out: ‘So you are that Mrožek! Come, let me give you a hug!’”30 Another, less beneficent 
26	 In	the	so-called	Slanskỳ	trial	Stalin	sent	the	Czech	communist	elite	to	the	gallows.	The	film	The Confession	(La	
Confesión)	was	by	Costa	Gavras	in	French-Italian	co-production	in	970.
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exchange took place between world-famous communist composer Luigi Nono and pol-
beat singer Wolf Biermann who had been expelled from the GDR the year before. Nono 
had tried beforehand to convince Biermann not to participate in the Venice event, try-
ing to scare the fresh emigrant away and arguing that those Biennale organizers merely 
wanted to use him for their own purposes. Biermann then wasted no time in sharing this 
“sensitive information” with his audience as he began his successful concert in Venice. 
A satellite event to the session on Nationalized Film Production was held at the Olympia 
Cinema, where 54 films were screened under the title Film and Eastern Europe. Andrzej 
Wajda, having recently fought the censorship of his latest film, Man of Marble, sent a 
telegraph to Venice declaring his lack of interest in a conference on nationalized film.31 
Another invited film director, the Hungarian Miklós Jancsó also canceled his appearance 
even though he had previously had a rather good relationship with the Italian Left.32 The 
visual art program entitled Neo-avantgarde Tendencies in Eastern Europe was organized by 
university professor Enrico Crispolti, art historian and critic – and a member of PCI. 
Eventually three exhibitions were realized: The Unofficial Perspective on New Soviet Art; 
Modern Art in Czechoslovakia; and Books, Journals, Samizdat. More than three hundred 
works by forty-nine Soviet artists were on display in the newly completed reinforced 
concrete basement of the Palazzo dello Sport. The majority of the selected artists were 
based in the Soviet Union but the works were on loan from western collectors. Pre-
sumably under pressure from the authorities, forty-three of them sent protest letters to 
Venice, objecting to the misuse of their works, acquired from private collections, at the 
“anti-Soviet” exhibition. 
The West-German press aptly pointed to this blunder: had the Biennale organizers re-
sponsibly considered what consequences participation at the Biennale would have for 
East-European artists? Or had they at all contemplated whether or why dissident artists 
should want to sacrifice a hard-won status quo back at home for the role of the extra 
offered to them within some clumsy political game? Yet another unanswered question 
to what extent the spirit of the artistic avant-garde was identical with that of political 
dissidence also remained unanswered. Why would it have been in Grotowski’s interest, 
for instance,– to call himself a political dissident considering that he was leading a state-
funded theater in Poland? In general: is an artist to be regarded a dissident if censorship 
prevents the display of his or her works? 
The Biennale secured a certain approach for the western public for a long time to come, 
the dangers of which were identified practically simultaneously by a number of theorists. 
For the label “political” came to be attached to East European art produced under the 
circumstance of “repressive tolerance” (to quote Marcuse), it could not show its real face 
3	 Ibid.
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and actual professional values. This subsequently resulted in an image of “this half of 
Europe […] full of blanks and the myths of official art and suffering dissidents.”33 The 
Biennale presented a dilemma for many who were ready to take into account the realities 
of détente: does the West indeed need the dissidents? And contrariwise, having fought for 
and won their little cultural freedoms, do East European intellectuals have an interest in 
risking their remaining room to maneuver? 
Whether explicitly or not, the Biennale’ chief aim appears to have been to demonstrate 
the narrow path between communism and social democracy by way of the example of 
East European dissidents. Its emblem, a Soviet star with one of its segments opening up, 
alluded to the same vision. Leszek Kolakowski, however, pointed out the error of looking 
for a path that did not exist on the very first day of the event. “The term ‘dissident’ is mis-
leading because artistic creativity is only conceivable in the form of political opposition 
– at all times and everywhere – and because the basic nature of communism excludes any 
tolerance of such an opposition.” For him, tolerance as practiced in Eastern Europe was 
no sign of the gradual improvement of the regimes, but were “symptoms of an ideologi-
cal paralysis from which these systems were extremely unlikely to recover.”34 
From the very start, director Ripa di Meana’s program centered around the sensitive 
issue that the Biennale was indeed a politicized institution, and this had to be acknowl-
edged and radically interpreted. How well his program succeeded is another question. 
The decentralization of the Biennale’s institution and the shift away from an obsolete 
mainstream towards alternative artistic positions were among his ultimate goals to struc-
turally reform the Biennale, and were both a grand vision and an enormous achieve-
ment. Although his contemporaries were far from unanimous in favoring his notions, 
the processes set in motion were irreversible. In addition to restructuring the Biennale, 
his ideas also opened new paths in the discourse on the relationship of art and politics. 
His Biennale del Dissenso drew attention to art in countries behind the Iron Curtain, a 
subject field still being processed today. 
Translated from the Hungarian original by Katalin Orbán
33	 Zdenka	Badovinac:	Body	and	the	East,	in	Body	and	the	East,	From	the	960s	to	present,	Moderna	Galerija,	Lju-
bljana,	Museum	of	Modern	Art,	exhibition	catalogue,	Ljubljana,	998,	.	See	also	Adrian	Henri,	Environment	
and	Happenings,	London,	Thames	and	Hudson,	974,	28.
34	 Hansjacob	Stehler:	Kongress	gebrannter	Kinder,	Die	Zeit,	December	,	977.	
